Fighting Open Space Organizations

Artur F. Silva artsilva at mail.eunet.pt
Tue Oct 16 15:11:35 PDT 2001


At 18:19 15-10-2001, Chris Corrigan wrote:

>I am dumbfounded by this article:
>
><http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109272330.htm>http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109272330.htm
>
>
>It describes Al-Qaeda as, essentially, an Open Space Organization,

I think yours are very interesting questions, Chris. The hypothesis of
Al Qaeda being close to an Open Space Organization disturbs me.
My feeling is that somehow the answer must be "No". But the arguments
in favour seem convincing. I suppose I will need some more time before
I am able to understand my own thinking about that. But I am reading
very carefully all the messages on this thread, to see if some comments
will help my understanding.

In the meanwhile, I red all the article on the link you sent us to
understand the context. And I found other things very disturbing,
but in a completelly diferent direction.

First, it is clearly recomended that when fighting this enemy through
a coalison war, that war has no possibility of fulfilling the objectives,
unless a very special two-tiered strategy will be followed. One tier
is the "public war", that shall be conducted by the coalision. But it is
clearly recomended that the only way to fight Al Qaedaa is that the USA
alone conduct a second covert war that would include the killing
of individaul persons in any country, including allies - without the
knowing of no one (including the governments of those countries).
Indead, and according with the recomendation, the public war (that
we see every day on TV) is only to "cover" the real one.

This is very interesting: Is it my impression or the analysts recomend
to the USA that they become even more the "policies of the word", that
they assume even clearly an imperial stance that has been denied until
now? And that they make covert military operations even in the countries
of the allies?

[I am sure that some Roman strategic specialist must have made similar
proposals to the rulers of the Roman Empire, sooner before it collapsed.
Maybe preventing them to the terrible Open Space mouvement of
terrorists know as Christians...]

What I think about this analysis is that they have concluded that a
conventional coalison war will not solve the problem. But they are NOT
trying to change the paradigm and ONLY "addapt it" to conditions where
it is useless.

These analysts, contrarily to coronal Bowman, have not understand that the
cover WAR is creating milions of new terrorists in Islam and hundreds
of new "empowered cells".

And when they recomend that the USA intervene even within their allies'
countries,
they will make that many citizens of their allies (namely in Europe) will
become anti-americans themselves.

So the war can not be gained unless a strategy will be used that will not only
put islamic countries against USA, but even Europe.

The strategists are proposing what they think that can result. But for me - as
the proposed solution is impossible - this is a demonstration (by the
reduction
to the absurd) that the war can't be gained. Col. Bowman could
have explained that to these new "strategists"

Some quotations to foundament my interpretaction:

Quotations:

-
>Part 4: The Intercontinental Theater of Operations
>                   2330 GMT, 010927
>
>                   Summary
>
>
>                   Given the intercontinental nature of the threat of
>                   terrorism, standard coalition warfare will not win the
>                   battle. A coalition will limit the ability of the United
>                   States to operate covertly on foreign soil, but
>                   Washington cannot simply go it alone. A two-tiered
>                   strategy is required. On one level, the coalition will
>                   have its uses and will provide cover. But on another
>                   level, the United States must control its own
>                   intelligence war.

(...)


>                  Thus a dilemma is embedded in the American
> intercontinental strategy. The war that
>                   the United States must prosecute is essentially an
> intelligence war, designed to locate
>                   and destroy al-Qa'ida in a number of countries. In
> order to do this, the United States
>                   must create a coalition of intelligence and security
> organizations to provide the United
>                   States with information, operational forces on the
> ground ready to act on the intelligence
>                   and the right for U.S. covert forces to take fairly
> extreme actions on their soil.
>(...)
>
>                  In a police action, particularly in the United States,
> the first requirement is not the
>                   apprehension of the criminal, but rather the protection
> of the rights of citizens. The
>                   governing principle is that it is better for 10 guilty
> men to go free than for one innocent
>                   man to be convicted. In warfare, the reverse is the
> case. In destroying enemy forces, it
>                   is accepted and expected that innocent bystanders also
> will die. The notion of guilt or
>                   innocence is not really relevant to warfare.
>
>
>                   Within the United States, the first principle will
> continue to pertain. The rules of U.S.
>                   operations overseas will be much more complex. In the
> intercontinental intelligence war,
>                   proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt simply will
> not surface. There will be no judges
>                   and juries. Intelligence operatives will have to make
> decisions -- sometimes in split
>                   seconds -- concerning who will live and who will die.
>
>
>                   In discussions about removing limits on state-sponsored
> assassinations, American
>                   thinking has focused on countries like Afghanistan or
> Iraq. In these countries,
>                   intelligence operations are a subset of military
> operations, and the same rules ultimately
>                   apply. The situation is fundamentally different in
> Germany or Japan. The expectation
>                   there is that those theaters will operate by the same
> rules as North America: local
>                   forces will have control and the legal system will
> continue to govern.
>
>
>
>
>                   If it is to have a chance of success, the United States
> must be able to act decisively
>                   and quickly, regardless of political considerations --
> and also, by definition, operate in a
>                   sphere not only beneath proof beyond a reasonable doubt
> but also in which innocent
>                   people will certainly become casualties.
>
>
>                   Israel consciously decided that destroying certain
> groups like Black September was
>                   necessary, even if it meant turning Europe into an
> intelligence battleground and even if,
>                   on occasion, inevitable mistakes led to civilian
> casualties. This is a critical choice the
>                   United States faces. It is a choice that cuts against
> the grain of the coalition warfare
>                   strategy Washington is following. In a sense, it is
> almost unthinkable that U.S. agents
>                   would begin killing French citizens on French soil. But
> given the flexibility and speed
>                   that al-Qa'ida has shown, and given the limits that
> rules of evidence place on
>                   intelligence operations, it is difficult to imagine
> another strategy.
>
>
>                   The task is to identify those operatives and either
> capture them -- questioning them
>                   rigorously, as the saying goes -- or kill them. This is
> a global operation, and it cannot be
>                   shared with a coalition. Information can flow only one
> way: from allies to U.S.
>                   intelligence operations. On another level, the
> coalition can function -- harassing
>                   al-Qa'ida, capturing and trying lesser members, tying
> up money and so on.
>
>
>                   In other words, a two-tiered war is required. The
> public war is a law enforcement
>                   challenge, much like what will happen in North America.
> A very secret war, perhaps
>                   never confirmed, that limits itself to extremely
> high-value targets and makes as few
>                   mistakes as humanly possible also must be waged. The
> coaliton will be able to tolerate
>                   a small number of such operations, widely scattered in
> time and space, of which all
>                   sides deny knowledge. It cannot tolerate wholesale warfare.
>
>
>                  The United States must unravel al-Qa'ida's network
> without having the main effort
>                   sapped by attacks on peripheral relationships. There
> will be time enough for that later.
>                   Rather, the task of U.S. intelligence is to look for
> bin Laden's necessary vulnerabilities --
>                   people, money, buildings. When those are found to be of
> sufficient importance, they
>                   must be destroyed using secret U.S. forces deployed
> around the world, frequently
>                   without the knowledge or permission of the host
> country. And if these forces are
>                   captured, Washington, like Israel does, will deny
> everything. If they are killed, they will
>                   be forgotten, except for a star on a wall in Langley, Va.


Am I seeing this incorrectly?

Regards

Artur


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