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At 18:19 15-10-2001, Chris Corrigan wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite cite>I am dumbfounded by this article: <br>
<br>
<a href="http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109272330.htm">http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109272330.htm</a>
<br>
<br>
It describes Al-Qaeda as, essentially, an Open Space Organization, </blockquote><br>
I think yours are very interesting questions, Chris. The hypothesis of<br>
Al Qaeda being close to an Open Space Organization disturbs me.<br>
My feeling is that somehow the answer must be "No". But the arguments<br>
in favour seem convincing. I suppose I will need some more time before <br>
I am able to understand my own thinking about that. But I am reading <br>
very carefully all the messages on this thread, to see if some comments <br>
will help my understanding.<br>
<br>
In the meanwhile, I red all the article on the link you sent us to <br>
understand the context. And I found other things very disturbing,<br>
but in a completelly diferent direction.<br>
<br>
First, it is clearly recomended that when fighting this enemy through <br>
a coalison war, <b>that war has no possibility of fulfilling the objectives, <br>
unless a very special two-tiered strategy will be followed</b>. One tier <br>
is the "public war", that shall be conducted by the coalision. But it is <br>
clearly recomended that the only way to fight Al Qaedaa is that the <b>USA <br>
alone conduct a second covert war that would include the killing <br>
of individaul persons in any country, including allies - without the <br>
knowing of no one (including the governments of those countries).</b> <br>
Indead, and according with the recomendation, the public war (that <br>
we see every day on TV) is only to "cover" the real one.<br>
<br>
This is very interesting: Is it my impression or the analysts recomend <br>
to the USA that they become even more the "policies of the word", that <br>
they assume even clearly an imperial stance that has been denied until <br>
now? And that they make covert military operations even in the countries <br>
of the allies? <br>
<br>
[I am sure that some Roman strategic specialist must have made similar<br>
proposals to the rulers of the Roman Empire, sooner before it collapsed.<br>
Maybe preventing them to the terrible Open Space mouvement of<br>
terrorists know as Christians...]<br>
<br>
What I think about this analysis is that they have concluded that a <br>
conventional coalison war will not solve the problem. But they are NOT<br>
trying to change the paradigm and ONLY "addapt it" to conditions where <br>
it is useless.<br>
<br>
These analysts, contrarily to coronal <font face="arial" size=2>Bowman</font>, have not understand that the <br>
cover WAR is creating milions of new terrorists in Islam and hundreds <br>
of new "empowered cells".<br>
<br>
And when they recomend that the USA intervene even within their allies' countries,<br>
they will make that many citizens of their allies (namely in Europe) will <br>
become anti-americans themselves.<br>
<br>
So the war can not be gained unless a strategy will be used that will not only<br>
put islamic countries against USA, but even Europe.<br>
<br>
The strategists are proposing what they think that can result. But for me - as<br>
the proposed solution is impossible - this is a demonstration (by the reduction <br>
to the absurd) that the war can't be gained. Col. Bowman could <br>
have explained that to these new "strategists"<br>
<br>
Some quotations to foundament my interpretaction: <br>
<br>
Quotations:<br>
<br>
-<br>
<blockquote type=cite cite>Part 4: The Intercontinental Theater of Operations<br>
2330 GMT, 010927<br>
<br>
Summary<br>
<br>
<br>
Given the intercontinental nature of the threat of<br>
terrorism, standard coalition warfare will not win the<br>
battle. A coalition will limit the ability of the United<br>
States to operate covertly on foreign soil, but<br>
Washington cannot simply go it alone. A two-tiered<br>
strategy is required. On one level, the coalition will<br>
have its uses and will provide cover. But on another<br>
level, the United States must control its own<br>
intelligence war.</blockquote><br>
(...)<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite cite> Thus a dilemma is embedded in the American intercontinental strategy. The war that<br>
the United States must prosecute is essentially an intelligence war, designed to locate<br>
and destroy al-Qa'ida in a number of countries. In order to do this, the United States<br>
must create a coalition of intelligence and security organizations to provide the United<br>
States with information, operational forces on the ground ready to act on the intelligence<br>
and the right for U.S. covert forces to take fairly extreme actions on their soil.<br>
(...)<br>
<br>
In a police action, particularly in the United States, the first requirement is not the<br>
apprehension of the criminal, but rather the protection of the rights of citizens. The<br>
governing principle is that it is better for 10 guilty men to go free than for one innocent<br>
man to be convicted. In warfare, the reverse is the case. In destroying enemy forces, it<br>
is accepted and expected that innocent bystanders also will die. <b>The notion of guilt or<br>
innocence is not really relevant to warfare.</b><br>
<br>
<br>
Within the United States, the first principle will continue to pertain. The rules of U.S.<br>
operations overseas will be much more complex. In the intercontinental intelligence war,<br>
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt simply will not surface. There will be no judges<br>
and juries. Intelligence operatives will have to make decisions -- sometimes in split<br>
seconds -- concerning who will live and who will die.<br>
<br>
<br>
In discussions about removing limits on <b>state-sponsored assassinations</b>, American<br>
thinking has focused on countries like Afghanistan or Iraq. In these countries,<br>
intelligence operations are a subset of military operations, and the same rules ultimately<br>
apply. <b>The situation is fundamentally different in Germany or Japan.</b> The expectation<br>
there is that those theaters will operate by the same rules as North America: local<br>
forces will have control and the legal system will continue to govern.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
If it is to have a chance of success, the United States must be able <b>to act decisively<br>
and quickly, regardless of political considerations -- and also, by definition, operate in a<br>
sphere not only beneath proof beyond a reasonable doubt but also in which innocent<br>
people will certainly become casualties.</b><br>
<br>
<br>
Israel consciously decided that destroying certain groups like Black September was<br>
necessary, even if it meant turning Europe into an intelligence battleground and even if,<br>
on occasion, inevitable mistakes led to civilian casualties. This is a critical choice the<br>
United States faces. It is a choice that cuts against the grain of the coalition warfare<br>
strategy Washington is following. In a sense, <b>it is almost unthinkable that U.S. agents<br>
would begin killing French citizens on French soil. But given the flexibility and speed<br>
that al-Qa'ida has shown, and given the limits that rules of evidence place on<br>
intelligence operations, it is difficult to imagine another strategy.</b><br>
<br>
<br>
The task is to identify those operatives and either capture them -- questioning them<br>
rigorously, as the saying goes -- or <b>kill them</b>. <b>This is a global operation, and it cannot be<br>
shared with a coalition. Information can flow only one way: from allies to U.S.<br>
intelligence operations. </b>On another level, the coalition can function -- harassing<br>
al-Qa'ida, capturing and trying lesser members, tying up money and so on.<br>
<br>
<br>
In other words, a two-tiered war is required. The public war is a law enforcement<br>
challenge, much like what will happen in North America. A very secret war, perhaps<br>
never confirmed, that limits itself to extremely high-value targets and makes as few<br>
mistakes as humanly possible also must be waged. The coaliton will be able to tolerate<br>
a small number of such operations, widely scattered in time and space, of which all<br>
sides deny knowledge. It cannot tolerate wholesale warfare.<br>
<br>
<br>
The United States must unravel al-Qa'ida's network without having the main effort<br>
sapped by attacks on peripheral relationships. There will be time enough for that later.<br>
Rather, the task of U.S. intelligence is to look for bin Laden's necessary vulnerabilities --<br>
people, money, buildings. <b>When those are found to be of sufficient importance, they<br>
must be destroyed using secret U.S. forces deployed around the world, frequently<br>
without the knowledge or permission of the host country. And if these forces are<br>
captured, Washington, like Israel does, will deny everything. If they are killed, they will<br>
be forgotten, except for a star on a wall in Langley, Va.</b></blockquote><br>
<br>
Am I seeing this incorrectly?<br>
<br>
Regards<br>
<br>
Artur<br>
<br>
<br>
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