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<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Hallo friendsonthelist:</FONT></DIV><FONT
face=arial,helvetica><FONT size=2>
<DIV><BR>An overseas friend of mine took this from a newsletter - it's a letter
from a</DIV>
<DIV>West Point Grad to some of his classmates about his perceptions that
he</DIV>
<DIV>developed during his time in Afghanistan.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>My friend has a friend who owns the Afgan telecommunications
company:</DIV>
<DIV>he says the article is factual. For myself I have no knowledge as to its
authenticity.</DIV>
<DIV>But for me, it comes acoss as real. I pass it along as hopefully additive
to our</DIV>
<DIV>perspective on the events which (continue to) surround us. </DIV>
<DIV><BR><BR>Dear Classmates: <BR><BR>Many of you are probably not aware that I
was one of the last American <BR>citizens to have spent a great deal of time in
Afghanistan. I was first there <BR>in 1993 providing relief and assistance to
refugees along the Tajik border and <BR>in this capacity have traveled all along
the border region between the two <BR>countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the
Deputy Program Manager for the UN's <BR>mine action program in Afghanistan. This
program is the largest civilian employer <BR>in the country with over 5,000
persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later <BR>capacity, I was somewhat
ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as decreed by <BR>the Taliban, against the
evil of landmines, and by a special proclamation of <BR>Mullah Omar, all those
who might have died in this effort were considered to <BR>"martyrs" even an
"infidel" like myself. The mine action program is the most</DIV>
<DIV>respected relief effort in the country and because of this I had the
opportunity to <BR>travel extensively, without too much interference or
restriction. I still have <BR>extensive contacts in the area and among the
Afghan community and read a <BR>great deal on the subject. <BR><BR>I had wanted
to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite <BR>frankly I have
been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had <BR>time. Dr. Tony
Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them <BR>as a basis for
sharing some observations. First, he is absolutely correct. This <BR>war is
about will, resolve and character. I want to touch on that later, but <BR>first
I want to share some comments about our "enemy." <BR><BR>Our enemy is not the
people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated beyond <BR>what most of us can
imagine. The vast majority of the people live day-to-day, <BR>hand to mouth in
abject conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation. Less <BR>than 30% of the
men are literate, the women even less. The country is exhausted, <BR>and
desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the world
<BR>at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that would counter
<BR>what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing
that is <BR>except for their pride. <BR><BR>Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is
a group of non-Afghans, often referred <BR>to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a
fanatical group of religious leaders and <BR>their military cohort, the Taliban.
The non-Afghan contingent came from all over <BR>the Islamic world to fight in
the war against the Russians. Many came using a <BR>covert network created with
assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin <BR>Laden was referred to by
us in the country at the time) restored this network to <BR>bring in more
fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against <BR>the
former Mujehdeen. Over time this military support along with financial
<BR>support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government
<BR>activities and leaders. <BR><BR>OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban
armed forces, his bodyguards <BR>protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a
system of deep bunkers for the <BR>Taliban, which were designed to withstand
cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he <BR>learn to do that?). His forces
basically rule the southern city of Kandahar. <BR><BR>This high-profile presence
of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years <BR>or so, started to generate a
great deal of resentment on the part of the local <BR>Afghans. At the same time
the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started <BR>to decrease as it has
failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions <BR>have worsened and as
"cultural" restrictions have become even harsher. <BR><BR>It is my assessment
that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed <BR>the Taliban have
recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their <BR>forces and
have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from <BR>Pushtun tribes in
Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any</DIV>
<DIV>US action were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all
other outsiders and <BR>outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan-defeat
and dismemberment. <BR><BR>During the Afghan war with the Soviets much attention
was paid to the <BR>martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at
the time and</DIV>
<DIV>most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want
to go help the <BR>brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the
Soviets. Those concepts <BR>were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never
conquered as a nation, are <BR>not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan
battle is one that makes a lot of <BR>noise and light. Basic military
skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural <BR>constraints that no matter
what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, <BR>firing from the prone
is considered distasteful (but still one).Traditionally, <BR>the Afghan order of
battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing <BR>allegiance to a
"commander" and this person owing allegiance upwards and so <BR>on and so on.
Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while the <BR>Taliban forces
have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban</DIV>
<DIV>army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such groups
have very <BR>strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept
of having a <BR>place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and
blood feuds between <BR>families and tribes can last for generations over a
perceived or actual slight. <BR>That is one reason why there were 7 groups of
Mujehdeen fighting the <BR>Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and
keep united a large bunch of Afghans <BR>into a military formation. <BR><BR>The
"real" stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are very
<BR>enlightening and a lot different from our fantastic visions as cadets. When
<BR>the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group,
<BR>another group-supposedly on the same side, attacked the first group and
stole the <BR>Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them, but because
having <BR>them was a matter of prestige. <BR><BR>Many larger coordinated
attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when <BR>all the various Afghan
fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such <BR>as blocking or
overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to <BR>seek glory.
<BR><BR>In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of
fatalities <BR>were lower for all involved. As you can tell from above, it is my
assessment <BR>that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military sense and
the "Arabs <BR>probably even less so than the Afghans. <BR><BR>So why is it that
they have never been conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's <BR>point about will.
During their history the only events that have managed to <BR>form any semblance
of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign <BR>invaders. And in
doing this the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' <BR>greatest military
strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in <BR>all probability,
kill most Americans and enervate [sic] the resolve of all but <BR>the most elite
military units. <BR><BR>The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan,
the terrain, the weather <BR>and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies
will use to their advantage <BR>and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner
types and armchair generals--</DIV>
<DIV>around November 1st most road movement is impossible, in part because</DIV>
<DIV>all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air movement
will be</DIV>
<DIV>problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight.
<BR><BR>OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a
fight. <BR>Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the
overwhelming <BR>consensus was that we were cowards, who would not risk one life
in <BR>face-to-face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a
deterrent,</DIV>
<DIV>that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the
perception <BR>that the US does not have any "will" and that we're are morally
and spiritually <BR>corrupt. <BR><BR>Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses
of our enemy, notably their <BR>propensity for internal struggles, the distrust
between the extremists/Arabs <BR>and the majority of Afghans, their limited
ability to fight coordinated battles <BR>and their lack of external support.
More importantly though is that we have to <BR>take steps not to play to their
strengths, which would be to unite the entire <BR>population against us by
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to <BR>get bogged down trying
to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition <BR>chasing up and down
mountain valleys. <BR><BR>I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a
big question and well <BR>beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not
want to second-guess <BR>current plans or start an academic debate. I
would share the following from <BR>what I know about Afghanistan and the
Afghans. First, I would give the <BR>Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that
they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban <BR>army before winter. Second, also
with this cash I would pay some guys to kill <BR>some of the Taliban leadership
making it look like an inside job to spread distrust <BR>and build on existing
discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with <BR>military assets,
but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine <BR>its
legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans. Fourth would be to give massive
<BR>amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in
<BR>order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live
rather <BR>than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the
"infidel." <BR>Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the
country not under <BR>Taliban control (these are much more than the press
reports) - again to <BR>demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with
peace. Sixth, I would <BR>consider very carefully putting any female service
members into Afghanistan <BR>proper-sorry to the females of our class but within
that culture a man who <BR>allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and
we will need respect <BR>to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan
will work with a man who <BR>fights with women. I would hold off from doing
anything too dramatic in the near <BR>term, keeping a low level of covert action
and pressure up over the winter, <BR>allowing this pressure to force open the
fissions around the Taliban that were <BR>already developing. <BR><BR>Expect
that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick up <BR>the
pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do "pick-up" the pieces I
<BR>would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man-to-man." While I would
never <BR>want to advocate American casualties, it is essential that we
communicate to OBL</DIV>
<DIV>and all others watching that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy
in close <BR>combat." As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold
terrain, but <BR>Infantry operations against the enemy are essential. There can
be no excuses <BR>after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our
enemies regarding <BR>American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate
this except for ground <BR>combat. <BR><BR>And once this is all over, unlike in
1989 the US must provide continued <BR>long-term economic assistance to rebuild
the country. <BR><BR>While I have written too much already, I think it is also
important to share <BR>a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents
will not abide by the <BR>Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless
there is a chance that <BR>they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner
exchange. During the <BR>war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist
prisoners having their <BR>throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in
prisoners so that souvenir <BR>videos could be made by outsiders to take home
with them. This practice has <BR>spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya
were similar videos are being <BR>made today and can be found on the web for
those so inclined. We can expect <BR>our soldiers to be treated the same way.
Sometime during this war I expect that <BR>we will see videos of US prisoners
having their heads cut off. <BR><BR>Our enemies will do this not only to
demonstrate their "strength" to their followers,</DIV>
<DIV>but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against
civilian populations</DIV>
<DIV>and to turn this into the world-wide religious war that they desperately
want. <BR><BR>This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further
elaboration of this</DIV>
<DIV>type of activity please read Kipling). This will not be a pretty war; it
will be a war of wills,</DIV>
<DIV>of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of character. Towards
our</DIV>
<DIV>enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our
military</DIV>
<DIV>character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must
show a level</DIV>
<DIV>of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this not for
humanitarian</DIV>
<DIV>reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military logic. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>(forwarded by)</DIV>
<DIV>Winston<BR><BR></DIV></FONT></FONT></BODY></HTML>