Sun Tzu

[william becker]

Try this one on for size:

America is now prepared to shoot down our own citizens should they be on a
high jacked plane.

Meanwhile, the terrorist hide behind their women and children and like
Sadahm will "take the form of families" and then reappear once the dust is
settled. They also in essence wear outer garments that seem peacful, butr
inside are really warriors.

Therefore, if we are willing to kill our own citizens  in high jacked
situations to protect our selves, should we not be willing to kill the
enemies civilians along with the terrorists  to protect ourselves.  Albeit
it should be held to absolute minimum. But how else do we deal with these
kinds of people who think and act the way they do?

If we can scare the hell out of their families, friends, supporters enough
to given them all up and we don't have to fire a shot that will be
great......but doubtful.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Judi Richardson" <richarjl at AKERLEY.NSCC.NS.CA>
To: <OSLIST at LISTSERV.BOISESTATE.EDU>
Sent: Friday, September 28, 2001 9:31 AM
Subject: Sun Tzu


> I honor moving the conversation to another place, and thank all those who
have shared so much with us all in this place.  As the conversation moves, I
offer the following written by a friend for a local newspaper, following the
teachings of Sun Tzu.
>
> Terrorism's Trojan Horse.
>
> As the American expeditionary force sails away on its opening campaign in
the War Against
> Terrorism, do they know the enemy? Seeing it clearly is vital to victory
and to the safety of the
> West. Yet there is a gnawing sense that something has slipped under the
radar and could be very
> close to home indeed.
>
> In the aftermath of the blood-curdling events of last week a terrible
resolve stalks the U.S.
> Politicians and journalists alike have deafened us with their war-cries,
while a recent poll reported that 58% of Americans wanted military action --
even if it meant the death of many thousands of innocent civilians. With the
harsh logic of war, it seems that American popular reasoning has become
indistinguishable from the terrorist's.
>
> If ever there was a time for political and military leaders to ignore the
voice of the people, this is it. It has been known for millennia that rage
in war leads to defeat and if Bin Laden or other shadowy figures are taken
to be the opposing generals (and both sides now see this as war) they must
be seen skilled, ice-cold, strategists indeed.
>
> They have turned the enemy's power against himself, and they have
perfected a decisive skill,
> what Sun Tzu in The Art of War calls forming the enemy while remaining
formless oneself. Their
> forces stay invisible, emerging to strike, while the opponent lunges into
thin air.
>
> They have achieved remarkable victories, mobilizing history's mightiest
military against them and, like Giap of Vietnam, hooking the U.S. on the
horns of an agonizing dilemma -- it may have
> little option but to act offensively, yet almost any aggression will stir
up a terrorist cauldron. Bin Laden hopes the U.S. will respond to his bloody
provocation and fall into this trap.
>
> Yet, although the West seeks to hunt down Bin Laden, they have set their
sights much higher, and
> plan on a 10-year campaign to flush out terrorists across the globe. This
mission will require far different and far subtler techniques than the ones
normally needed for manhunts or warfaring.
>
> Here the ghosts of the past rise up. The medieval Crusaders' chief tactic
was the all-out charge
> -- but Muslim armies quickly learned to give way before it, opening their
ranks and allowing it to expend its force in space, while attacking the
Crusaders' flanks or rear. Later, Lawrence of
> Arabia, was to see his Arab forces as like "... an influence ... an idea,
a thing invulnerable,
> intangible, drifting about like a gas ... a vapour ... Our kingdoms lay in
each man's mind ... "
>
> Conventional warfare fails against guerilla warfare or terrorism. It seeks
to deliver a knock-down blow to the enemy's strongpoint or centre of
gravity. There is no such centre. Special forces may hunt down personalities
or bases, but in the face of the assault commanders, camps and trainees will
likely dissolve into the terrain only to reform like vapour when the dust
has settled.
>
> Intelligence on terrorists and their movements becomes a main, potent,
weapon. Technology has
> -- calamitously -- failed to provide this sort of intelligence. What is
needed is earthy, human,
> intelligence, and this must be gained primarily from friendly governments,
accessible informers,
> and ordinary people.
>
> This is where the enemy comes into focus, if Western commanders but widen
their gaze to see it.
> Its dispositions are strong and, as a superb recruiter and motivator, it
inspires ruthless attacks. This opponent, hatred, has for years been gaining
power in the Mideast. Its power will be boosted by the presence of large,
aggressive, U.S. forces and -- should they charge in and kill innocent
people or otherwise act with ruthlessness -- it will ignite. If hatred
explodes, the campaign will likely go up in flames, and Bin Laden's trap
will have done its work.
>
> Sun Tzu talks of taking whole, of avoiding destruction in favour of a
strategy which respects the
> human context and the world in which we will live once the conflict is
past: "Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skilful." In
this fraught region, campaigns will have to be undertaken with great caution
and -- whatever the impulse for revenge -- with minimal
> aggression.
>
> For Sun Tzu, knowing self and other is the key to generalship: "Not
knowing the other and not
> knowing oneself, in every battle certain danger." If Western, perhaps
especially U.S., leaders fail to identify hatred and its close ally,
revenge, as the enemy, their campaign will collapse and in the ruins they
will have sown dragon's teeth of retribution.
>
> This skilled general will know, and have mastered, this opponent. He will
understand that under
> the bombs and missiles there will be people -- men, women, and children
who experience
> suffering in the same way we do. This understanding does not come from
moral, ethical or
> religious scruples. It is just good strategy.
>
> So the main enemy force may lie close to home, maybe even within the
gates. This enemy must be
> engaged. And as the conflict unfolds, we might ask ourselves: who are the
aggressors, who the
> aggrieved? Who are the victims, who the victors?
>
>
>
>
> Grant MacLean, a freelance writer living in St. Margaret's Bay, Nova
Scotia, is co-
> author/translator of Sun Tzu's The Art of War: A New Translation
(Shambhala Publications,
> 2001).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Terrorism's Trojan Horse.
>
>
> As the American expeditionary force sails away on its opening campaign in
the War Against
> Terrorism, do they know the enemy? Seeing it clearly is vital to victory
and to the safety of the
> West. Yet there is a gnawing sense that something has slipped under the
radar and could be very
> close to home indeed.
>
> In the aftermath of the blood-curdling events of last week a terrible
resolve stalks the U.S.
> Politicians and journalists alike have deafened us with their war-cries,
while a recent poll reported that 58% of Americans wanted military action --
even if it meant the death of many thousands of innocent civilians. With the
harsh logic of war, it seems that American popular reasoning has become
indistinguishable from the terrorist's.
>
> If ever there was a time for political and military leaders to ignore the
voice of the people, this is it. It has been known for millennia that rage
in war leads to defeat and if Bin Laden or other shadowy figures are taken
to be the opposing generals (and both sides now see this as war) they must
be seen skilled, ice-cold, strategists indeed.
>
> They have turned the enemy's power against himself, and they have
perfected a decisive skill,
> what Sun Tzu in The Art of War calls forming the enemy while remaining
formless oneself. Their
> forces stay invisible, emerging to strike, while the opponent lunges into
thin air.
>
> They have achieved remarkable victories, mobilizing history's mightiest
military against them and, like Giap of Vietnam, hooking the U.S. on the
horns of an agonizing dilemma -- it may have
> little option but to act offensively, yet almost any aggression will stir
up a terrorist cauldron. Bin Laden hopes the U.S. will respond to his bloody
provocation and fall into this trap.
>
> Yet, although the West seeks to hunt down Bin Laden, they have set their
sights much higher, and
> plan on a 10-year campaign to flush out terrorists across the globe. This
mission will require far different and far subtler techniques than the ones
normally needed for manhunts or warfaring.
>
> Here the ghosts of the past rise up. The medieval Crusaders' chief tactic
was the all-out charge
> -- but Muslim armies quickly learned to give way before it, opening their
ranks and allowing it to expend its force in space, while attacking the
Crusaders' flanks or rear. Later, Lawrence of
> Arabia, was to see his Arab forces as like "... an influence ... an idea,
a thing invulnerable,
> intangible, drifting about like a gas ... a vapour ... Our kingdoms lay in
each man's mind ... "
>
> Conventional warfare fails against guerilla warfare or terrorism. It seeks
to deliver a knock-down blow to the enemy's strongpoint or centre of
gravity. There is no such centre. Special forces may hunt down personalities
or bases, but in the face of the assault commanders, camps and trainees will
likely dissolve into the terrain only to reform like vapour when the dust
has settled.
>
> Intelligence on terrorists and their movements becomes a main, potent,
weapon. Technology has
> -- calamitously -- failed to provide this sort of intelligence. What is
needed is earthy, human,
> intelligence, and this must be gained primarily from friendly governments,
accessible informers,
> and ordinary people.
>
> This is where the enemy comes into focus, if Western commanders but widen
their gaze to see it.
> Its dispositions are strong and, as a superb recruiter and motivator, it
inspires ruthless attacks. This opponent, hatred, has for years been gaining
power in the Mideast. Its power will be boosted by the presence of large,
aggressive, U.S. forces and -- should they charge in and kill innocent
people or otherwise act with ruthlessness -- it will ignite. If hatred
explodes, the campaign will likely go up in flames, and Bin Laden's trap
will have done its work.
>
> Sun Tzu talks of taking whole, of avoiding destruction in favour of a
strategy which respects the
> human context and the world in which we will live once the conflict is
past: "Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skilful." In
this fraught region, campaigns will have to be undertaken with great caution
and -- whatever the impulse for revenge -- with minimal
> aggression.
>
> For Sun Tzu, knowing self and other is the key to generalship: "Not
knowing the other and not
> knowing oneself, in every battle certain danger." If Western, perhaps
especially U.S., leaders fail to identify hatred and its close ally,
revenge, as the enemy, their campaign will collapse and in the ruins they
will have sown dragon's teeth of retribution.
>
> This skilled general will know, and have mastered, this opponent. He will
understand that under
> the bombs and missiles there will be people -- men, women, and children
who experience
> suffering in the same way we do. This understanding does not come from
moral, ethical or
> religious scruples. It is just good strategy.
>
> So the main enemy force may lie close to home, maybe even within the
gates. This enemy must be
> engaged. And as the conflict unfolds, we might ask ourselves: who are the
aggressors, who the
> aggrieved? Who are the victims, who the victors?
>
>
>
>
> Grant MacLean, a freelance writer living in St. Margaret's Bay, Nova
Scotia, is co-
> author/translator of Sun Tzu's The Art of War: A New Translation
(Shambhala Publications,
> 2001).
>
> *
> *
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