Viewpoint of Mr. Brzezinski. I'd guess pretty close to what will happen.

J. Paul Everett JPESeeker at aol.com
Tue Sep 25 20:03:42 PDT 2001


Commentary: A Plan for Political Warfare
The Wall Street Journal   09/25/01
author: Zbigniew Brzezinski
(Copyright (c) 2001, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)

The United States has been sucked into a world-wide conflict with
terrorism, a struggle in which America will prevail only if it acts
effectively both on the military and political fronts. Two realities have
to be faced squarely:

Terrorism is political warfare. By deliberately and indiscriminately
killing innocents, it is designed to break the will of the opponent.
Counterterrorism also has to involve political warfare. It must strive to
isolate the terrorists politically in order to extirpate them physically.

Not religion as such, but political resentments, often energized by
fanatical religious beliefs, fuel terrorism. The current struggle is not
against "Islamic terrorism," just as the struggle against the IRA is not
against "Christian terrorism." The suppression of terrorist organizations
and activities must therefore also address some, if not all, of the
political resentments that galvanize support for terrorism.

The U.S. Response

It is in that broad context that the U.S. must shape its long-term,
medium-term, and immediate response to the attacks. The long-term response
should promote an international coalition to enhance domestic security as
well as to undermine political support for terrorist causes. The
medium-term response will have to target the governments that tolerate or
clandestinely support terrorism, while disrupting the terrorist networks
that operate in the Middle East, Western Europe and North America. The
immediate response will have to involve direct military action against
known terrorist facilities and leaders in Afghanistan and the Middle East,
as well as against the Taliban regime.

The long-term response -- over the next several years -- in some ways is
the easiest to outline. It should focus on shaping a world-wide coalition
of states that share an interest in reduced vulnerability to terrorist
acts. The sharing of intelligence, more tightly coordinated police
actions, more transparent financial transactions, and the exposure of
money-laundering operations, are all objectives that the majority of
governments share, including China and Russia. No political or financial
payment by the U.S. for participation in such a campaign should be
expected since enhanced security is needed by all. Russia should be
particularly sensitive to that need, given that the Soviet Union helped to
organize, train and arm many of the terrorist groups that are antecedents
of the current threat.

Much of that long-term effort will have to be focused on Western Europe
and the U.S. The more democratic the government, the easier for terrorist
networks to conceal themselves and to strike. It is clear that most of the
preparations for the recent attacks were pursued over several years --
with remarkable impunity and a disturbing lack of penetration by law
enforcement agencies -- within America itself.

The more difficult and sensitive aspect of the long-term response is the
need to undercut political support of terrorism. Terrorists thrive on
popular passions that spawn fanatical hatreds. Just as effective warfare
against guerrillas requires their isolation from supporting rural
populations, so political warfare against terrorism calls for the
mobilization of moderates against extremists. Toward this end, the U.S.
should work toward a more rapid attainment of peace between the Israelis
and the Palestinians (an early meeting between Ariel Sharon and Yasser
Arafat would be helpful); a more decisive campaign against Saddam
Hussein's regime itself, and not policies that seem to harm the Iraqi
people more than their dictator; a more flexible policy toward the more
liberal elements in Iranian politics; and a more generous assistance for
the Afghan and Pakistani peoples.

The medium-term response -- over the next several months -- will be the
most difficult. It will have to focus on governments that have tolerated
tacitly or secretly supported terrorist organizations, or perhaps even
colluded in terrorist acts. If collusion is reasonably determined -- for
example, if Saddam Hussein provided organizational or planning assistance
to the recent outrage -- direct U.S. military action to destroy such a
regime would be not only justified, but required.

In the meantime, covert action, as well as attacks by U.S. forces against
identified terrorist training camps and other facilities in some Middle
Eastern countries would be appropriate, though it would be wise to
discriminate carefully the chosen targets. The possibility that the
terrorists benefited from financial aid, perhaps exacted by blackmail,
from rich members of some ruling elites should also precipitate intense
and direct pressure on the pertinent regimes. Of course, an integral part
of any medium-term response will have to be a concerted effort by the U.S.
and its allies to roll up the more obvious terrorist networks operating in
Western Europe and America itself.

The most pressing decisions are the ones that need to be made immediately.
A decisive, bold, and early military response is needed in order to
underline America's commitment to the campaign against terrorism and, to
put it bluntly, to exact painful retribution. That raises the question of
how we respond, where we respond, against whom we respond, and -- if
possible, with whom we respond.

The response should not be overly personalized: The standard of success
should not be whether Osama bin Laden is killed or captured, though either
outcome would be highly gratifying. Rather, a successful strike would be
one that inflicts a painful blow on the terrorist high command and its key
facilities, some of which are located in Afghanistan, including the
capture or elimination of some of the terrorists.

It is particularly important that any initial U.S. military reaction
should involve Special Forces and other elite units. It should not be
confined to cruise missiles fired from afar or bombs dropped from on high.
Such previous technologically antiseptic strikes have helped to create an
image of a timid America that is not ready to roll up its sleeves and
fight seriously.

Also for political reasons, it would be desirable for some of America's
key partners (the British, French and Germans) to take part in any early
reaction. Their participation would symbolize not only solidarity among
allies but would convey the degree to which the response to terrorism is
genuinely international. It would also help to keep America
internationally involved.

A Comprehensive Strategy

Presumably, some of the early strikes will be aimed at the Taliban regime.
Here, the key point is to pursue such operations without becoming involved
in a ground campaign and without overtaxing the capacity of the government
(and especially the army) of Pakistan to provide needed support. Apart
from any assault on the terrorists themselves, the fundamental purpose of
operations directed at the Taliban should be to galvanize domestic Afghan
opposition to that regime.

The U.S. has been attacked and challenged. The tactics of our response
have to be guided by a comprehensive strategy that is militarily
relentless while politically sensitive.

Mr. Brzezinski is a national security adviser under President Carter, is
author of "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives" (Basic Books, 1997).

*
*
==========================================================
OSLIST at LISTSERV.BOISESTATE.EDU
------------------------------
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change your options,
view the archives of oslist at listserv.boisestate.edu,
Visit:

http://listserv.boisestate.edu/archives/oslist.html



More information about the OSList mailing list